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Wolf: Resolving the Conflict Between Jewish and Secular Estate Law

NOTE
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN JEWISH
AND SECULAR ESTATE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

Fred and Judith are an observant1 Jewish couple. They have two
children, David and Esther. The majority of their million dollars in
assets, which comprise their life savings, are in Fred's name, as is the
interest they will use to support themselves during their retirement. Fred
and Judith drafted mirror wills, each one giving their entire estate to the
other, or, if he or she should die first, to their children David and Esther,
in equal shares. Recently, Fred learned that by bequeathing the entirety
of his estate to his wife, or to both Esther and David equally, he may be
transgressing certain Jewish civil laws.2
The purpose of this Note is to recommend a solution to the conflict
that observant Jewish clients face in estate planning between their
adherence to Jewish inheritance law and their desire to create an estate
plan that is both effective and practical according to state law.
Many scholars have written about the potential conflicts between
Jewish law and an observant Jew's role as a lawyer in a number of
different contexts, primarily focusing on how the lawyer's role can be
reconciled with Jewish law.3 Most articles have only addressed these

1. Throughout this Note, I have chosen to use the term "observant," as opposed to
"orthodox," in order to broaden this Note's audience. Some Jews may consider themselves
"observant" of Jewish law, but not orthodox. For instance, many reform and conservative Jews may
be observant of many of the Jewish laws, including those associated with inheritance. Also, many
members of the Chabad movement do not consider themselves "orthodox." KIDMa-The
Southwest Community, http://www.kidma.org/2007/03/what-modem-orthodoxy-means-to-me.html
(Mar. 16, 2007, 10:33 EST). This Note, therefore, is intended to be relevant to the broader
population of those who may identify with the more general term, "observant."
2. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
3.

See MICHAEL BROYDE, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND JEWISH LAW, at xiii-xiv (2d ed.,

Yashar Books 2007) (1996) (noting a number of areas of Jewish law that observant Jewish attorneys
must consider in various areas of legal practice); Amy Porter, Representing the Reprehensible and
Identity Conflicts in Legal Representation, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REv. 143, 155-61(2004)
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issues from the lawyer's perspective. 4 They have primarily discussed
how observant Jewish lawyers may engage in the practice of law without
violating their own religious commitments. But few have addressed how
an attorney can assist observant Jewish clients in achieving their legal
goals without transgressing their religious obligations.
Due to the localized nature of estate law, it was necessary to pick a
jurisdiction for purposes of this Note. I have chosen to use New York
State law as the pertinent jurisdiction because it has the highest Jewish
population in the United States. 5 That said, the purpose of the Note is to
recommend a solution to the apparent conflict between secular and
Jewish law in estate planning anywhere in the United States. Therefore,
it is this author's hope that readers will test these proposals against their
own state's laws so that they may apply the solutions offered in their
own legal practice.
For purposes of this Note, I will refer to heirs who inherit under
Jewish law as "halachic heirs" and those who would not inherit under
Jewish law as "non-halachic heirs." Additionally, I will often refer to
estate planning clients using masculine pronouns because, as the reader
will discover in the following pages, the major challenge for an
observant Jewish individual exists for a man who is trying to ensure that
his wife and daughters are adequately provided for after his passing.
Part II of this Note will start by explaining the basic structure of
Jewish inheritance law. It will explain the automatic nature of succession
under Jewish law and the order of priority in which heirs inherit a
decedent's estate. It will focus, in particular, on the fact that under
6
Jewish law, no last will and testament can alter this succession plan. It
will then proceed to outline the probate and intestate schemes under
New York State law. It will then explain how, under Jewish law, any
7
posthumous gift given through a will is wholly invalid. Because all of a
decedent's property automatically transfers to his halachic heirs at
death, any beneficiaries who take under any other distribution scheme,
such as under a will, are effectively stealing from the halachicheirs.
(discussing ethical dilemmas that attorneys of various religions face in the field of criminal law).
See generally Steven H. Resnicoff, A Jewish Look at Lawyering Ethics: A Preliminary Essay, 15
TOURO L. REV. 73 (1998) (analyzing ethical conflicts that observant Jewish attorneys face in a
number of contexts).
4. See, e.g., BROYDE, supra note 3, at xiii.
5. Ira M. Sheskin & Arnold Dashefsky, Jewish Population of the United States, 2007, in 107
AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK 133, 159 (David Singer and Lawrence Grossman eds., 2007),
available at http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC DATA/Files/AJYB708.CV.pdf.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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Part III will outline four methods of allowing individuals to make
an estate plan that comports with their goals for their family while
avoiding any violation of Jewish law. It will explain each of the four
methods, each approach's relative advantages and disadvantages and the
reason or reasons why each approach may not be an ideal solution.
The first method offered is the Jewish law doctrine of upholding the
last wishes of the deceased. 8 Under this approach, the decedent's last
will and testament is viewed as evidence of his wishes as to the
distribution of his property after death. 9 The original context in which
this principle was used will be analyzed and this method will be shown
to be inapplicable as a solution to the conflict between Jewish and
secular inheritance law.
The second method considered is the Jewish law principle known
as "the law of the land is the law."' This principle incorporates certain
provisions of secular law into Jewish law. If this concept were applicable
to inheritance law, it would obviate the conflict between Jewish law and
modem estate planning goals under secular law by creating a unity
between the two systems. Although some major authorities in Jewish
law do use this method to address the problem, it is not recognized as a
valid solution by the vast majority of Jewish law authorities."'
The third method this Note considers is the establishment of a
revocable trust.' 2 Under Jewish law, the property that one holds title to at
death transfers automatically to his halachic heirs. '3 But any non-probate
property, such as property held in trust, would not be subject to
automatic transfer because the decedent does not hold title to that
property at his death. Even under Jewish law, property would be
distributed according to the terms of the trust instrument under which it
is held. This method suffers from some practical challenges, however,
that may make it less than ideal as an estate planning device for many
people.
The fourth method involves the use of revocable, contingent inter
vivos gifts. These types of gifts effectuate the transfer of all of a

8. 3 CHAIM JACHTER,
CHALLENGES 281 (2008).

GRAY

MATTER:

EXPLORING

CONTEMPORARY

HALACHIC

9. Id. at 282.
10. I. GRUNFELD, THE JEWISH LAW OF INHERITANCE: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS IN MAKING A
JEWISH WILL 17 (1987).

11. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
12. Jonathan Porat, Kosher Revocable Trusts: The Jerusalem Trust Form, JEWISH LAW, 1998,
http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/revocable.html.
13. Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures:
The CorporateParadigm,43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1772 (1997).
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decedent's property shortly before death 14 in order to preempt the
automatic transfer of property at death to the decedent's halachic heirs. 5
This Note will explain this method and the reasoning of those authorities
who advocate it. This approach has certain practical difficulties in its
application and certain legal challenges, however, that make it an
unreliable avenue to pursue.
Part IV will explain the note of indebtedness method 6 that this
author believes to be the most practical and legally enforceable method
of resolving the conflict for the majority of observant Jewish clients.
This method consists of a testator writing a last will and testament and
then executing a note of indebtedness to one or more of his non-halachic
heirs which will become due shortly before his death, but will not be
payable if the halachic heirs willingly consent to the testator's
distribution plan as described in his last will and testament. If, however,
the halachic heirs challenge the will's distribution in a Jewish tribunal
("beis din"), the note would be due and owing against the estate and
would effectively wipe out the portion they would have received under
17
the will to satisfy the debt to the non-halachicheirs.
Some situations exist wherein the note of indebtedness method may
still contravene Jewish law.' 8 This Note will explain when these issues
are raised, and solutions to these challenges will be considered in light of
their practicality and legal enforceability under both Jewish and secular
law.
Part V will consider the ethical considerations inherent in any
approach that circumvents Jewish inheritance law. 19 After considering
sources in the Jewish legal tradition which argue against bypassing
Jewish law's order of succession, this section will demonstrate how
these ethical principles are not applicable to the majority of modem
estate planning situations and how failing to use one of these methods
may, in fact, lead to additional violations of Jewish law and rabbinic
public policy.
14.
15.

GRUNFELD, supranote 10, at 102-05.
7 EMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW 164 (1996).

16. Id. at 245. Rabbi Quint does not cite specific sources for this approach. Samuel J. Levine,
A Restatement of Rabbinic Civil Law, Volumes VII and VIII, 17 J.L. & RELIGION 251, 253-54
(2002) (book review). This approach is also advocated by Rabbi Feivel Cohen. FEIVEL COHEN,
KUNTRUS MIDOR L'DOR 5 (1987).

17. 7 QUINT, supra note 15, at 243-44.
18. COHEN, supra note 16, at 6-7.
19. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Kesubos 53a (discouraging inter vivos gifts that effectively
disinherit one halachic heir over another); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Basra 133b (stating that
although inter vivos gifts to non-halachic heirs are effective to disinherit halachic heirs, this
practice is frowned upon by the sages).
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II. THE CONFLICT

A. The Scheme Under Jewish Law
Jewish law is a system that encompasses both the sacred and the
mundane aspects of an observant Jew's life. Jewish religious law
determines not only how one should keep the Sabbath and pray, but it
also dictates how its adherents conduct themselves in the areas of
20
employment law, contracts, business ethics, criminal law, and torts.
They do not recognize any distinction between their religious and
secular obligations. 21 Therefore, a clear understanding of Jewish civil
law is very important to observant Jews because they strive to observe
that aspect of Jewish law no less than any of their other, ostensibly more
"religious," obligations.
The same religious duty that exists with regard to Jewish civil law
in general exists for the Jewish law of inheritance. The following
paragraphs comprise a brief summary of Jewish inheritance law.
22
Under Jewish law, a decedent's property automatically transfers
to pre-designated beneficiaries at death.23 The principles governing the
transfer and the order in which halachicheirs take are as follows:
Halachic heirs take their share of a decedent's estate according to
an order of priority. 24 If someone of a higher priority level survives the
decedent, then that person takes the entire estate.25 If no member of a
higher priority level survives the testator, then the lineal descendents of
that person take his share, per stirpes.26 If no one on the higher priority
level, or his or her lineal descendents, survive the decedent, then the
estate goes to the individual or individuals at the next lower priority
20. See Judge Martin E. Ritholtz, Remarks at the Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center Symposium: The Enforcement of a Jewish Marriage Contract in a Civil Court: Is Jewish
Law a Religious Law? (Nov. 23, 1998), in JEWISH L. REP., Apr. 2000, at 15-16,
http://www.tourolaw.edu/academic-programs/institutes/pubs/jewish%201aw%20reportapril%202000.pdf.
21. Asher Maoz, Can Judaism Serve as a Source of Human Rights?, 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L
L. 677, 680 (2004).
22. Broyde & Resnicoff, supranote 13, at 1772.

23. For the rules defining the order of priority of heirship, see Numbers 27:8-11. If a decedent
has surviving heirs in the level of priority, they or (if they predecease the decedent) their offspring,
would inherit the entire estate. If not, then heirs in the second order of priority would inherit the
estate, and so on at each level of priority. Id.; see also Deuteronomy 21:17 (establishing the rule that
the firstborn son gets a double portion relative to all sons that are born after him).
24. See generally SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 276 (setting forth the entire halachic
inheritance scheme).
25. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 276:1.

26. Id.
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level.27 At each level of succession, women29only inherit in the absence
of men. 28 The order of priority is as follows:
sons (the oldest son receiving a double portion);
daughters;
father of the decedent;
paternal brothers;
paternal sisters;
paternal grandfather;
paternal uncles;
paternal aunts;
paternal great-grandfather;
30
this pattern continues back through the generations, ad infinitum.
Under this scheme, therefore, a wife does not inherit a share of her
husband's estate. More specifically, a wife is entitled to choose between
two options. She is entitled to an amount equal to the value of her prenuptial agreement, known as a ketubah, from the estate . 3 Alternatively,
32
she may choose to be supported from the estate until she remarries.
Under the halachic system, if there are sons, daughters do not
inherit,33 but they are entitled to have their wedding expenses paid from

27. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 276:1-2.
28. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 276:2.
29.

SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 276:1.

30. Id. Although many people may have significant questions about the equity of these rules,
a full analysis of the policies and history underlying this system is beyond the scope of this Note. It
suffices to say that reasons are provided by Jewish law to explain the fact that daughters do not
inherit where there are sons and why a wife does not take a regular share of her husband's estate.
For one explanation, see GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 99.
31. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Ha'ezer 91:1. The ketubah is a prenuptial agreement signed
before Jewish couples marry. It is a contract that obligates the husband to pay the wife a sum of
money in the event that they are divorced-somewhat similar to modem day maintenance
payments. Michael Broyde & Jonathan Reiss, The Value and Significance of the Ketubah, 47 J.
HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 101, 101 (2004). In the event he passes away while they are married,
the Ketubah is a lien against the estate for the purpose of providing support for the widow. Id.
Rabbis Broyde and Reiss suggest that the value of the ketubah in U.S. dollars may be between
approximately $8000 and $167,000, according to the holdings of various rabbinic responsa. Id. at
107 & n.24, 108. According to one of the principal halachic authorities on Jewish law at the Beth
Din of America, the current value of the ketubah is approximately S33,000. Mordechai Willig, The
Halachah of Wills, in BETH DIN OF AMERICA, HALACHIC WILL MATERIALS 2 (2008),
http://www.bethdin.org/docslPDFl4-HalachicWillMaterials.pdf.
32. See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK FOUR: THE BOOK OF WOMEN 18:1-20:14, at 11430 (Isaac Klein trans., 1972) (stating that a widow is entitled to maintenance from the estate
property, but if she chooses to claim the value of the ketubah in a beis din, she no longer has any
claim to maintenance); Mary F. Radford, The Inheritance Rights of Women Under Jewish and
Islamic Law, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 135, 171-72 (2000).
33. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 276:1.
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their father's estate under certain conditions.34 Minor daughters are
entitled to financial support and medical care from estate assets.3 5 The
amount daughters are entitled to receive for these expenses is calculated
based on their father's financial
means and how much he paid for the
36
weddings of older sisters.
Any attempt to posthumously transfer property by means of a will,
or by intestate succession, to heirs other than those designated by Jewish
law, is invalid 37 and a violation of Jewish law 38 due to the reasons noted

by Professors Broyde and Resnicoff:
[T]here is no decedent's estate from which to transfer funds. As a
matter of Jewish law, all of the decedent's possessions are
automatically and immediately transferred to the Jewish law heirs upon
the decedent's death. Consequently, for the beneficiaries under the will
to take possession of the decedent's property would, under Jewish law,
be tantamount to taking property that was owned
39 by the Jewish law
heirs and would be prohibited as a form of theft.
If one applies these rules to Fred and Judith's circumstances, the
result is that if Fred predeceases Judith, only their son David would
inherit, and neither Judith nor their daughter Esther would take a share in
Fred's estate according to Jewish law. Although it is true that Judith
would be cared for as long as necessary from estate funds until she
remarries, Fred is likely to seek an estate planning method that would
allow him to directly bequeath Judith all of his assets.
Furthermore, after Fred and Judith both pass away, David would
inherit the entire estate, and Esther would inherit nothing. Although it is
true that if Esther were a minor, she would be supported from their
estate, Fred and Judith would like to know if there is a way to bequeath
their assets to David and Esther equally.
B. The Scheme Under SecularLaw
Under New York State law, if a decedent leaves a last will and
testament, the court will probate the will and the executor then
distributes the assets of the testator to the beneficiaries named in the
34. COHEN, supranote 16, at 24 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Ha"Ezer113).
35. Id.at 23-24.
36. Yirmiyohu Kaganoff, Is a Will the Halachic Way?, BEIT-EL YESHTVA, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.yeshiva.org.ii/midrash/shiur.asp?id=9233.
37. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Misphat 281:1; 8 YAAKOV YESHAYA BLAU,
CHOSHEN 134 (1996).

PISCHEI

38. 7 QUINT, supra note 15, at 240.
39. Broyde & Resnicoff, supra note 13, at 1773.
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will. 40 If someone dies without a will, his assets are disposed of

according to New York's rules of intestate succession.4' Just as under
Jewish law, there is an order of priority among heirs in an intestate
42
succession scenario. The following is the order of intestate succession:
If the decedent is survived by:
A spouse and children, the spouse receives $50,000 plus half of the
remainder of the estate. The children share the remainder equally by
43
representation;
44
A spouse and no children, the spouse receives the entire estate;
Children, but no spouse, the entire estate goes to the children, by
45
representation;
Parents, but no
spouse or children, the whole estate goes to the
46
parents;
surviving
Siblings (full or half), but no spouse,
children or parents, the whole
47
estate goes to those surviving siblings;
Grandparents or their lineal descendents, but no spouse, children,
parents, or siblings, then one half of the estate to any surviving
grandparents and the remainder to the grandparents' lineal descendents
48
by representation, but stopping at the first cousins of the decedent;
Great-grandchildren of the decedent's grandparents, then half of the
estate to the paternal great-grandchildren
and half to the maternal great49
grandchildren, per capita;
If the decedent is not survived by any of the aforementioned heirs,
the estate escheats to New York State.50

40. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-1.1 (McKinney 1998).
41. Id. § 4-1.1.
42. Id. § 4-1.1(a).
43. Id. § 4-I .l(a)(1). "Representation" is defined as the division of property
into as many equal shares as there are (i) surviving issue in the generation nearest to the
deceased ancestor which contains one or more surviving issue and (ii) deceased issue in
the same generation who left surviving issue, if any. Each surviving member in such
nearest generation is allocated one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and
then divided in the same manner among the surviving issue of the deceased issue as if
the surviving issue who are allocated a share had predeceased the decedent, without
issue.
Id. § 1-2.16.
44. Id. §4-1.1(a)(2).
45. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(3).
46. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(4).
47. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(5).
48. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(6).
49. Id. §4-1.1(a)(7). "Per Capita" refers to when "[a] disposition or distribution of
property... is made to persons, each of whom is to take in his own right an equal portion of such
property." Id. § 1-2.11.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol37/iss4/11

8

Wolf: Resolving the Conflict Between Jewish and Secular Estate Law
20091

JEWISH AND SECULAR ESTATE LAW

Furthermore, under New York State law, if a spouse executes a
will, but does not include any provision for his or her spouse, the spouse
may take an "elective share," which is $50,000 or, if the estate is less
than $50,000, either the entire estate or one third of the net estate after
debts (other than taxes) are paid.5'
C. The Dilemma Facing ObservantJewish Clients
Given the state of secular and Jewish inheritance law, Fred and
Judith have a major problem. If Fred writes a will that bequeaths his
entire estate to his wife Judith, or to their children Esther and David
equally in the event Judith predeceases him, he will either cause his wife
Judith or his daughter Esther to violate Jewish law. This is because, as
noted above, Fred's estate automatically passes to his son David alone at
the moment of his death. 2 Thus the probate court's distribution of his
estate to Judith, if she survives him, or Esther, if Judith predeceases him,
would cause them to effectively "steal" a portion of David's inheritance
from him.
Fred may consider simply conforming the terms of his will to the
succession plan under Jewish law.53 Thus, he would simply draft his will
to give his entire estate to David, making no provision for his wife
Judith, other than the value of her ketubah, nor to his daughter Esther,
other than the amount necessary for her support if she is a minor. In the
alternative, he may consider incorporating the terms of Jewish
inheritance law by reference in his will. However, both of these plans
would be ineffective because Judith would only receive the value of her
ketubah which, according to many scholars of Jewish law, is valued at
less than $50,000.

4

In such a situation, Judith could sue for her elective

55

share under New York State law. The terms of the will, therefore,
would not be carried out in either case. 6

50. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2222(1) (McKinney 1997) (requiring that unclaimed
funds of a decedent be paid to the Comptroller of the State "for the benefit of the person or persons
who may thereafter appear to be entitled thereto").
51. N.Y. EST. POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.l-A(a)(2) (McKinney 1997).
52. See supra text accompanying note 23.
53. See 8 EMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW 117-27 (1997)
(delineating the laws of intestacy under Jewish law).
54. See Broyde & Reiss, supra note 31, at 107-08 (describing the various dollar values
attributed to the ketubah by rabbinic scholars).
55. NY EST. POWERS &TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1-A(d)(l) (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2009).
56. It should be noted that even though one may assume that the majority of the time, the
members of the testator's family are likely to conduct themselves in accordance with Jewish law,
this is not always the case for a variety of reasons. Sometimes a testator's spouse or children are not
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Alternatively, Fred might consider not writing a will, thinking that
he will thus avoid any violation of Jewish law by abstaining from any
action which would actively cause a violation of Jewish law. He may
assume that the court will distribute his assets according to the rules of
intestacy and that Judith, Esther, and David will be taken care of. This
approach, however, does not avoid a violation of Jewish law either,
because, by causing his estate to pass according to the intestacy statute,
Fred causes his non-halachic heirs, Judith and Esther, to effectively
"steal" property from the halachic heir, David. 7 Someone who is
committed to Jewish law will generally not want to indirectly
cause his
58
loved ones to sin any more than he, himself, wants to sin.
In any case, neither of these options is likely to appeal to Fred and
Judith or other observant Jewish clients today, who want, first and
foremost, to see that their spouses are financially secure after their
passing and who want their daughters to take equally with their sons.
Such individuals may want to do so without violating Jewish law and
may approach their attorney seeking a method by which they may
effectuate their desires within the parameters of both Jewish and secular
law.
III. SOME PROPOSED RESOLUTIONS
A. The Principleof Upholdingthe Wishes of the Deceased
The conflict between Jewish and secular inheritance law may be
resolved by utilizing the principle in Jewish law that provides heirs with
a religious obligation to honor the wishes of the deceased.5 9 According

as committed to the observance of Jewish law as the testator. It could also be that members of the
family may rely on divergent rabbinical holdings to justify challenging a decedent's efforts to make
a distributional plan that conforms to Jewish law. Regardless of the reason, it would be prudent for a
testator to anticipate potential weaknesses in his estate plan as if he expected any adversely affected
family members to challenge his estate plan, whether in secular court or in a Jewish tribunal. See,
e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, No. 106982, 2009 WL 3063395 (I11.Sept. 24, 2009) (reversing the
lower court's invalidation of a trust clause that would have disinherited any heir who married
outside the Jewish faith, which the testator drafted out of a recognition that some of his children and
grandchildren did not maintain their Jewish observance to the extent that he would have liked).
57. Broyde & Resnicoff, supra note 13, at 1773.
58. COHEN, supra note 16, at 7-8. But cf Resnicoff, supra note 3, at 87 (utilizing the Jewish
law prohibition of Lifnei Iver-causing another person to transgress a Jewish religious or civil
prohibition-to explain why observant Jewish attorneys should have an ethical obligation not to
enable their clients to violate Jewish law).
59. JACHTER, supranote 8, at 281 (noting the importance of "mollify[ing] the anxieties of the
seriously ill by assuring them that others will honor their instructions should they expire").
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to this principle, the halachic heirs would be religiously obligated to
willingly forego the additional amount of the decedent's estate that they
would have been entitled to under Jewish law. The will of the deceased
would thus serve as evidence of the decedent's desires, and his or her
heirs would be religiously obligated to honor those wishes.6 °
This proposed solution poses several difficulties. It is only effective
in some circumstances as a post facto solution, after a testator has passed
away having made no arrangements other than a typical last will and
testament. 61 Also, this principle only applies where the decedent
delivered his money and property to a third party as his death neared,
with instructions regarding its distribution.62 The typical testator does
not deposit his property with a third party.63 Furthermore, other rabbinic
scholars point out that even where it does apply, the commandment to
64
uphold the wishes of the decedent does not apply to minor children.
Thus, if David, Fred and Judith's son, would have been less than thirteen
years old, the age of majority under Jewish law, 65 he would have no
obligation to honor Fred and Judith's wishes, as expressed in their wills,
and Esther, the non-halachic heir, would effectively be stealing half of
David's share of the estate.66 For the foregoing reasons, one may not rely
on the principle of upholding the testator's wishes ab initio, as an ideal
67
solution for estate planning.
B. The Law of the Land is the Law
There is a general principle in many areas of Jewish civil law that
the secular civil law of the country in which an individual lives is
incorporated into Jewish law. 68 This principle functions primarily to

60.

SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 252:2.

61. JACHTER, supra note 8, at 282-83. According to the minority opinions quoted by Rabbi
Jachter, where a non-halachic legatee has already received an inheritance according to a decedent's
last will and testament, he may keep the bequest despite the fact that the majority opinion is that he
may not accept it. This is because his possession of the property places the burden of proof on the
halachic heirs. Because minority opinions do exist that maintain that he may keep the property, the
halaehic heirs will be unable to overcome their burden of proof to cause a rabbinic tribunal to
obligate the non-halachic heir to relinquish the property he already possesses. Id.
62.

COHEN, supra note 16, at 3 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 252:2).

63.

Id.

64. Id. (citing RABBEINU NissiM 8b (commenting on BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 13a)).
65. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Niddah 45b.
66. COHEN, supranote 16, at 4.
67. JACHTER, supra note 8, at 283.
68. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 17 (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Basra 54b-55a;
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Kama 113a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin l0b; BABYLONIAN
TALMUD, Nedarim 28a).
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incorporate each industry's customary business practices 69 and the
state's right to levy taxes into Jewish law. 70 However, a broad consensus
exists among rabbinic scholars throughout the ages that the principle of
"the law of the land is the law" is only a limited incorporation, and not a
general incorporation
of the local secular law as the operative Jewish
71
civil law.
Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, one of the preeminent authorities on Jewish
law in the last generation,72 extends this principle to resolve the conflict
between Jewish and secular inheritance law.73 He maintained that a
secular last will and testament is binding on a testator's legatees in
Jewish law, just as it is under secular law. 74 According to Rabbi
Professor Michael Broyde's interpretation of Rabbi Feinstein's responsa,
as long as the will uses language implying "giving," (as opposed to
"bequeathing" or "inheriting") the will is valid according to the principle
that "the law of the land is the law."7 5
However, a majority of rabbinic authorities disagree with this ruling
76
and maintain that such a secular will is invalid according to Jewish law
because the principle that "the law of the land is the law" only applies to
areas of law governing relations between Jews and Gentiles.7 7 They
maintain that this doctrine is78 ineffective in giving secular law effect
under Jewish inheritance law.
1. Advantages
The practical advantage of applying the doctrine of "the law of the
land is the law" to Jewish inheritance law is that it is the easiest and least
complex approach to solving the conflict. This approach does not require
69. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 201:1. Under Jewish law, a transaction between
two parties only becomes binding after they perform a specific act of acquisition, called a kinyan.
SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 189:1. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 103. However,
other words or acts which would not normally have any significance under Jewish law can,
nevertheless, render a transaction binding under Jewish civil law if that practice is standard within
an industry. For example, the custom in some jurisdictions was to seal a transaction by shaking
hands or exchanging a nominal sum of money. Where such actions were the custom of the local
merchants, these acts bound both parties to the sale according to Jewish law as well. SHULCHAN
ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 201:2.

70. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 18.
71. Id.
at 40-41.
72. Id.at 73.
73.

3 MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGROS MOSHE, EVEN HA'EZER § 104 (1961).

74. Id.
75.

BROYDE, supra note 3, at 128.

76. See, e.g., GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 73; JACHTER, supra note 8, at 278.
77. Non-Jews.
78.

GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 73.
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any ancillary documents to be signed by the testator, and it solves the
problem by taking away the conflict between the Jewish law of
inheritance and secular law by simply incorporating secular into the
Jewish inheritance law.
2. Disadvantages
The disadvantage of any attempt to rely on a secular will alone as
one's sole estate planning tool is that the principle that "the law of the
land is the law" is inapplicable to Jewish inheritance law according to
the vast majority of rabbinic scholars. 79 Thus, even though one eminent
scholar applies this doctrine to Jewish inheritance law, observant Jewish
individuals may seek out an approach which allows them to operate in
accordance with Jewish law.
Furthermore, Rabbi Feinstein himself stated his position in a post
facto context, where someone had already died with a last will and
testament as her only estate planning device. 80 He did not state that he
held that the application of "the law of the land is the law" to Jewish
inheritance law was a preferred estate planning tool, ab initio. 81 Thus,
there is no reason to infer that even Rabbi Feinstein himself advocated
the use of this approach to estate planning where other options are
available.
C. Revocable Trusts
The use of a trust is another potential way to circumvent the
conflict between Jewish and secular estate law. A trust is an instrument
whereby one person (the "settlor") grants property to another (the
"trustee") to hold title, with fiduciary duties, for the benefit of another
person (the "beneficiary").82 Thus, where the settlor of a trust makes
another person the trustee, he must grant the property that he wishes to
be held in trust, the "trust corpus," to the trustee. The trustee then owns
the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.8 3 In New York, where the
settlor makes himself the trustee, he must transfer the trust
corpus into
84
the name of the trust, rather than hold it in his own name.
79. Id. at 41.
80. FEINSTEIN, supra note 73, § 104.
81. Id.
82.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003).

83. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.18 (McKinney 2002). New York law permits the
settlor to transfer title to the property he wishes to place in trust to either the trust itself or to the
trustee, in his capacity as trustee. Id.
84. Id.
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1. Advantages
Mr. Jonathan Porat, an Israeli attorney, suggested the use of
revocable trusts to alleviate the conflict between secular and Jewish law
in estate planning. 85 He opined that one could create a revocable trust,
make himself the trustee and beneficiary as long he is alive and make his
wife or children the beneficiaries of the trust corpus upon his death. 6
This would achieve the same testamentary disposition that he would
have effected using a will. But since, in New York, the settlor must
transfer title of the trust corpus to the trust itself or to the trustee,87 rather
than allowing it to remain in his own name, this is an inter vivos gift,
and not
a posthumous one.88 Thus, it would be valid according to Jewish
9
8

law.

In New York State, the trust itself, or the trustee holds title to the
"trust corpus," and not the settlor. The New York Estate Powers and
Trusts Law requires that in order to fund a trust that has been created,
one must transfer title of that property into the name of the trust or the
trustee. 90 In the case of items that can be registered like real estate, bank
accounts, investment accounts, and stocks and bonds, the settlor of the
trust must record the deed to the property or register the stock or account
in the name of the trust. 91 Merely listing the property to be included in
the trust is insufficient. 92 The property must actually be transferred to the
trustee, as 94trustee, 93 even when the settlor is both trustee and
beneficiary.

85.

Porat, supranote 12.

86. Id. For background on New York trust law, see section 7-1.18.
87. § 7-1.18.

88. Attorneys in states other than New York should do further research to confirm whether
this method would be effective in states that do not require transfer of the trust corpus into the name
of the trust when the settlor is also the trustee. In those states, a settlor simply signs a "declaration of
trust," declaring that specific property that he already holds is now being held in trust for the benefit
of specific beneficiaries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10(c) (2003). Since he still holds the
trust property in his own name, it may still be considered "probate property" according to Jewish
law, and thus, subject to the order of succession usually prescribed by Jewish law, which may be in
conflict with the client's desired testamentary plan.
89. See supra note 37-39 and accompanying text. Thus, since the trust corpus is not directly
owned by the decedent, it is not subject to the halachic order of succession, and therefore
distribution to the non-halachicheirs would be valid according to Jewish law. Porat, supra note 12.
90. § 7-1.18.
91. Id.

92. In re Estate of Rothwell, 730 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666 (Sur. Ct. 2001).
93. In re Estate of Fontanella, 304 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (App. Div. 1969).

94. See § 7-1.18 (requiring that "[a] lifetime trust shall be valid as to any assets therein to the
extent the assets have been transferred to the trust" and making no exception where the settler is
also a beneficiary).
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The trust instrument thus has the effect, under Jewish law, of
making the trust corpus the property of an entity other than the settlor.
Under Jewish law, this has the effect of excluding the trust property
from the settlor's probate estate, which would have automatically
Thus it would not
transfered to his halachic heirs at death.
automatically revert to the halachic heirs at death, and the trust
instrument's96terms would take effect without causing anyone to violate
Jewish law.

2. Disadvantages
When an individual has even a small amount of personal property
that falls outside the scope of the trust that he has established, that
property would then comprise his probate or administrative estate and
distribution of that portion would still violate Jewish inheritance law.
Typically, a settlor would avoid this problem by executing a "pour over"
will to transfer any probate assets into a trust after death. 97 However, as
stated above, this is not effective according to Jewish law. 98 This will
result, in the majority of cases, in at least some of a testator's property
passing by will or intestate succession without the attempted benefit of
the revocable trust to avoid any conflict with religious law.
Another practical problem with this approach is that it would
require one to individually transfer all property he would like to dispose
of in this manner to the trust. Aside from the inconvenience in this
requirement, any property that one acquires over time would not be in
the trust, which necessitates further transfers of newly acquired property
throughout one's life, which is less than practical.
Solutions to this problem are possible, although still present more
trouble than most people would be willing to take on. In the case of Fred
and Judith, each one could place all of their checking accounts, direct
deposit transfers, life insurance policies, investment accounts, pension
plans, etc. into the name of the trust. Transfers of real estate do not take
place very frequently so they could easily hold title to those in the name
of their trusts. However, many items of personal property that they
acquire over time will not be readily transferred into the name of the
trust. Therefore, some property will invariably fall outside of the trust
corpus when one or both of them pass away. And this property would be
subject to either their will or to intestate succession, either of which
95.

Porat, supra note 12.

96. Id.
97.

N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.7(a) (McKinney 1998).

98. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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would conflict with their commitment to Jewish law, as stated earlier in
this Note. Thus, there are several challenges to utilizing this approach,
though they are not insurmountable.
D. Inter Vivos Gifts99
Dayan (Judge) Isador Grunfeld, former judge in the London Beth
Din, Great Britain's highest Jewish court, 00 has offered another solution
to enable observant Jews to effectuate their desired testamentary plan
without violating Jewish law. He recommends that one execute a gift
document indicating that he is giving all of his assets-real, personal,
and intangible-to X, Y, and Z as of the date of execution, with the
stipulation that the gift is only effective one hour before his death and
with the right of revocation. 0 1 This type of document is also referred to
by the Hebrew term, shtar matnas bari, or, "gift of a healthy person," as
distinguished from the gift of a dangerously sick person, a gift causa
mortis.10 2 Because this approach requires one to make an inter vivos gift,
it would also entail performing a symbolic act of acquisition
to
10 3
effectuate the gift under Jewish law, called a kinyan sudar.
Dayan Grunfeld recommends, however, that the shtar matnas bari
only be used in conjunction with a last will and testament, because
standing alone, it would be open to challenges under secular law.10 4 As
applied to New York law, this is also true because in order for an inter
vivos gift to be upheld in New York State, the donee has the burden of
proving three things: donative intent, delivery, and acceptance by clear
and convincing evidence.'0 5 While the donees may be able to prove
donative intent and acceptance easily, 10 6 delivery will be more difficult
99. A sample gift document may be found in GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 108-11.
100. Id. at xxiii.
101. Id. at 102-03. This approach is also advocated by Rabbi Chaim Shlomo Sheanon as a
solution to the same issues that this Note addresses, but with regard to Israeli law. Chaim Shlomo
Sheanon, Tzava'ah: K'halacha, http://www.daat.ac.il/DAAT/mishpach/zavaah-4.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2009).
102. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 102-03.
103. Id. The best form for this transfer is kinyan sudar.See BETH DIN OF AMERICA, HALACHIC
WILL MATERIALS 4 (2008), http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF14-HalachicWillMaterials.pdf. For
Rabbi Feivel Cohen's explanation of the procedure, see infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
104. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 104-05.

105. Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 872 (N.Y. 1986).
106. The test for donative intent is "whether the maker intended the [gift] to have no effect
until after the maker's death, or whether he intended it to transfer some present interest." McCarthy
v. Pieret, 24 N.E.2d 102, 103 (N.Y. 1939). Since the shtar matnas bari clearly states that the donees
are to have ownership of the specified property prior to the testator's death, and not after death,
donative intent would be established. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 108-11. Acceptance is also
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to prove. If one executes this gift document and the only accompanying
act of symbolic acquisition is the kinyan sudar,'0 7 the donees may not be
able to meet their burden of proving delivery.10 8 And even if the donees
would ultimately succeed, standing alone, this method lacks reliability as
a method of property distribution because such gifts are susceptible to
invalidation because of the high burden of proof placed on the donee. 109
1. Advantages
In conjunction with a last will and testament that mirrors its terms,
the shtar matnas bari solves the main problem that this paper addresses,
because it allows the testator to dispose of his property to his chosen
heirs without violating Jewish law. 1 0 Since the testator's property is
given to his heirs before death, without the opportunity for the Jewish
inheritance law scheme to take effect, one would not violate the Jewish
laws of inheritance by using either of these instruments."'
As applied to Fred and Judith, Fred would sign a document giving
all of his assets to Judith, to take effect one hour before his death, and if
usually presumed where the court finds donative intent and a valid delivery because acceptance is
presumed due to the beneficial nature of the gift. First National Bank v. Fitzpatrick, 289 N.Y.S.2d
314, 320 (App. Div. 1968), aff'dsub nom. In re Kelsey's Estate, 257 N.E.2d 663 (N.Y. 1970).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 132-36 for an explanation of procedure for conducting
a kinyan sudar.
108. Evidence of acts or statements of the decedent indicative of delivery to the donee may be
adequate to prove delivery, even absent evidence of physical delivery. In re Wolfs Will, 214
N.Y.S.2d 168, 171 (Sur. Ct. 1961). The element of delivery and the clear and convincing standard
of proof, however, place a heavy burden on the donees. Under New York State law, a donee must
prove that the donor completely relinquished control of the property without any power to revoke or
annul his gift. In re Kennedy's Estate, 290 N.Y.S.2d 964, 968 (Sur. Ct. 1968), modified, aff'd sub
noma.Estate of Kennedy v. May, 318 N.Y.S.2d 759 (App. Div. 1971). In Dayan Grunfeld's model
shtar matnas bari, however, it is explicit that he recommends making the gift revocable, so as to
allow the testator greater flexibility in his estate planning. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 109.
109. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Donees face an uphill battle to prove the
validity of their gift. The possibility of having to go to court to prove the gift's validity, the high
burden of proof, and the uncertain outcome render the inter vivos gift method less than ideal as an
estate planning solution because of the high likelihood that the donee will not be able to meet that
burden.
110. Tangentially, one should not outline a different disposition of his property in his last will
and testament than he does in his shtar matnas bari, regardless of which one he executes first.
GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 105. It is unadvisable to do so because a last will and testament and an
inter vivos gift with different terms appear to nullify one another. If one executes the shtar matnas
bari first, and then executes a will bequeathing all of his property at death, this implies that he
continues to hold title to his property at death, which would further imply that the gift taking effect
one hour before death was invalid or revoked. However, if he executes the gift document after the
will, it implies that he is revoking the will by subsequent instrument, since he is using a method
other than the will to dispose of all his property before death. Therefore, if one does intend to use a
shtarmamas bari,he should execute it alone, without any "back-up" last will and testament. Id.
11. GRUNFELD, supra note 10, at 105.
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she should predecease him, to his children David and Esther equally,
also one hour before his death. And Judith would execute a mirror gift
document as well.
2. Disadvantages
The primary problem with this method seems to be that it is
impractical. An inter vivos gift would only be effective under Jewish law
as to the property held by the testator at the time of the execution of the
shtar matnas bari."2 According to Jewish law, one cannot give any
assets that he has not yet acquired by inter vivos gift. 11 3 Practically
speaking then, one would be forced to execute these gift documents on a
regular basis in order to include assets that one acquires throughout his
life in the gift. For practical reasons, many people would prefer another,
more low-maintenance, approach.
However, even if he would repeatedly execute these gift documents
throughout his life, "man does not know his time,"' 14 and he may die
before he is able to execute an inter vivos gift to dispose of the property
that he acquired in his last days in accordance with Jewish law. As such,
that property which was not included in his most recent gift document
would be disposed of through his will. And as to that property, the same
problem of theft from his non-halachicheirs would arise."t5
IV. THE PREFERRED METHOD: NOTES OF INDEBTEDNESS" 6
This approach consists of executing a typical last will and testament
in conjunction with a document that creates a sizeable indebtedness to a
non-halachicheir."l 7 This debt would take effect immediately, but would
not be payable until one moment before the testator's death. 1 8 The note
of indebtedness document would stipulate that the halachic heirs have
the option of either paying the debt from the estate, effectively wiping

112. COHEN, supranote 16, at 2 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 211: 1).
113. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 211: 1.
114. Ecclesiastes 9:12.
115. See supra text accompanying note 39.
116. A note of indebtedness, traditionally called a shtar chatzi zachar ("half the male portion"),
existed in a family with one son and one daughter, where a parent wanted to bequeath half of his
estate to each child. Where the son would take the entire estate according to Jewish law, the shtar
chatzi zachar was used to give the daughter "half the male [heir's] portion"-in other words, half of

the estate. COHEN, supra note 16, at 5-6.
117. 7 QUINT, supra note 15, at 245. Rabbi Quint does not cite specific sources for this
approach. Levine, supra note 16, at 253-54. However, Rabbi Feivel Cohen advocates the same
method. COHEN, supra note 16, at 5.
118. 7 QUINT, supra note 15, at 246.
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out their entire inheritance, or consenting to the terms of the testator's
last will and testament, wherein they would receive an equal share with
their siblings. 119 The halachic heirs will almost certainly choose not to
challenge the will, lest they take nothing at all, if the estate were 2to be
liquidated to pay the note of indebtedness to the non-halachicheirs. °
As applied to Fred and Judith's situation, Fred and Judith would
each execute a note indicating that their respective estates would be
liable for a debt in the amount of one million dollars payable to Esther,
but only if David does not consent to Esther taking an equal share

119. Id. at247.
120. Id. at 244. For a sample note of indebtedness, see BETH DIN OF AMERICA, supra note 103,
at 4, 7 or COHEN, supra note 16, at 9-17. The sections of Rabbi Cohen's basic text for the note of
indebtedness most pertinent to this Note are as follows:
on the _ day of the month of ____, in the year __ , hereby declare
I, _
the following:
1. In the event that:
(a) any of my Torah Heirs (as defined in paragraph (2) below) will not waive his or
her rights to my Estate under Torah law and abide instead by the terms of my Last
Will and Testament ("Will") and
(b) the condition set forth in paragraph (3) below is complied with
Then I hereby assume upon myself as of this moment an indebtedness in the amount of
(hereinafter referred to as the "Obligee").
$_
(the "Debt") to _,
This debt shall be payable in full one moment prior to my death.
2. The term "Torah Heirs" shall mean those individuals who are entitled to inherit all or
part of my Estate under the Torah and the Code of Jewish Law.
3. In the event that certain Torah Heirs will waive their rights to my Estate under Torah
law and abide instead by the terms of my Will, the Obligee shall release those Torah
Heirs from any obligation under the Debt.
4. All real and personal property and all monetary assets which I now possess or may
hereafter acquire are pledged to secure this debt.
9. The Debt set forth in this document has been undertaken in a Jewish Court of high
standing ("Beis Din Choshuv") through an instrument legally fit to establish a
transaction ("Kinyan Suddar").
11. On the other hand, in the event that:
(a) all of my Torah Heirs will waive their rights to my Estate under Torah law and
abide instead by the terms of my Will, or
(b) the Obligee fails to comply with the condition set forth in paragraph (3) above,
or
(c) no will is admitted to probate (or is filed in a proceeding to manage my Estate
without formal court administration)
Then the Debt set forth herein shall be null and void and of no effect whatever, for the
Debt was not entered into under these conditions.

Signature
Id. at 9-12 (footnotes omitted).
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pursuant to their father's last will and testament. 2 1 However, if he
consents to the will's distribution to his mother and to his sister Esther,
he will retain his share under the will and the note in favor of Esther will
never become payable. Thus, by inducing David to agree to distribution
according to the will, this method avoids the problem of "theft" from the
halachic heirs because the note of indebtedness merely functions as
leverage to persuade David to willingly consent to the equal division of
Fred and Judith's estate.
A. Advantages
The note of indebtedness has the advantage of inducing the
halachic heirs willingly to assent to the distribution plan laid out in the
testator's will. The halachic heirs' consent removes the concern that the
non-halachicheirs who take pursuant to the testator's will are effectively
"stealing" the portion of the estate that would have gone to the halachic
heirs according to Jewish inheritance law.
Furthermore, this method is effective regardless of the
enforceability of the debt according to secular law. Although, in many
instances, it will not be enforceable under secular law because of an
apparent lack of consideration supporting the promise, 122 it would still
serve its intended function. This is because the testator's will is, in any
23
case, enforceable under secular law independent of the indebtedness,
and in a beis din, consideration is not required to make the note of
indebtedness enforceable. 2 4 Therefore, even if the halachic heirs would
consider suing the non-halachic heirs in a beis din for their share of the

121. See, e.g., 7 QUINT, supra note 15, at 247 (explaining how a note of indebtedness would
function where the non-halachicheir is the decedent's spouse).
122. See Felt v. Olson, 425 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687 (App. Div. 1980) ("In order for [a creditor] to
succeed on her cause of action based upon these two notes it was necessary for [creditor] to prove
that there was consideration for the notes."). However, the Court of Appeals has held, in some
instances, that if a husband creates a debt to his wife, a non-halachic heir, his general obligation to
support her will constitute consideration to support the creation of this debt. Buchanan v. Tilden, 52
N.E. 724, 726 (N.Y. 1899). The same cannot be said of a testator's other non-halachic heirs. With
regard to whether consideration exists to support the promise made through the note of indebtedness
to one's spouse, the Court of Appeals in New York stated that "[i]t is quite true that the husband is
under an obligation to support the wife, and it may be that any contract which he makes with a third
party, having for its object the carrying out of that obligation, would be enforced in the courts." Id.
123. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1414(1) (McKinney 1995).
124. See SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 257:7 (stating that a person's unilateral
declaration that he owes another person money is sufficient to create a debt); Judah Dick, Halacha
and the Conventional Last Will and Testament, 2 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y 5, 11-12 (198 1)
("A person may create an indebtedness even if none previously existed, even if no loan or other
consideration was ever given, merely by executing a note in favor of another person.").
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estate, they would be motivated to abstain from doing so because a beis
din would enforce the note of indebtedness against their portion of the
estate. 125 Thus, by suing in beis din for their halachic portion of the
estate, the halachic heirs would lose the portion they would have
received under the will, which would clearly be against their own
interests. 126
The note of indebtedness method does not suffer from the
inconveniences of the trust method. Using a trust, the conflict between
Jewish and secular law is only obviated as to the property with which
one funds the trust. Thus, for the revocable trust method to be effective,
one must first fund the trust by transferring checking and savings
accounts, real estate holdings, and personal property into the name of the
trust. 27 He would also want to register the trust as the beneficiary in his
life insurance and pension plans. After that, on an ongoing basis, he will
have to continue signing checks and all official documents as "John Doe,
as trustee for the John Doe Revocable Trust,"' 128 an inconvenience that
not everyone is willing to take on. However, with a note of indebtedness,
one need not make any transfers of property, since the debt will accrue
against any and all property that the testator owns at the time of death.
And since the testator's property will not be held in trust, he will not be
required to sign his documents in any special way. Thus, a note of
indebtedness does not involve the same inconveniences and requires less
maintenance than a trust.
Furthermore, the note of indebtedness does not have the practical
disadvantages of the inter vivos gift. One who disposes of his property
with successive revocable inter vivos gifts must continually execute new
gift documents. 129 A note of indebtedness, however, is lower
125. If a dispute arises between observant Jews, they are religiously obligated to litigate their
disagreement in a beis din. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 88b. In fact, if one party summons
another party to beis din and that party refuses to respond to the summons, the beis din may issue a
contempt order (called a "seruv") against the recalcitrant party, which carries with it social
ramifications within the observant Jewish community. See Jonathan Reiss, Jewish Divorce and the
Role of Beit Din, JEWISH ACTION, Winter
1999, at 50, 52, available at
http://www.ou.org/publications/ja/5760winter/biet%20din.pdf. Here too, if a halachic heir
challenges the distribution of the will in beis din, the non-halachic heir, for whose benefit the
testator executed a note of indebtedness, could summon the halachic heir to beis din to collect on
the full value of the note of indebtedness.
126. Thus, the shtar chatzi zachar functions much like a "no contest clause" in a secular will,
which is defined as "[a] provision designed to threaten one into action or inaction; esp., a
testamentary provision that threatens to dispossess any beneficiary who challenges the terms of the
will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 485 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).
127. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.18 (McKinney 2002).
128.

See JOHN W. REILLY, THE LANGUAGE OF REAL ESTATE 397 (6th ed. 2006).

129. See supra text accompanying note 112-115.
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maintenance because it takes effect against all property held by the
testator at the time of his death, and no ongoing transactions are
required. 130 Even if one executes multiple wills, after signing a note of
indebtedness, he is not required to execute new notes of indebtedness
because the potential debt accrues against his estate if his halachic heirs
object to the terms of whichever 13last
will and testament is valid and
1
unrevoked at the time of his death.
B. Procedure
According to Rabbi Feivel Cohen, the attorney convenes the
testator or testators along with the executor or his agent. 13 After the
names, date, and the amount of the indebtedness are filled out, the
testator must perform a symbolic physical act of acquisition in order to
demonstrate his commitment to create the note of indebtedness. 1 33 This
act is called kinyan sudar and it is performed according to the following
procedure:
The testator declares to the [executor or his agent] his intention to
execute a Kinyan Suddar in order to establish an indebtedness upon
himself, whereupon the [executor or his agent] gives the testator some
object (e.g. a handkerchief, a writing implement, etc.) with the intent
of entitling himself thereby to the indebtedness in symbolic exchange
for the object. The testator then raises the object thirty centimeters
(approx. twelve inches); he has thus acquired the object and the
indebtedness has thereby been established. The testator then returns the
object to its original owner.134
Although the testator will write two notes of indebtedness, as will
be explained in Part IV.C.1 of this Note, he need only perform one
kinyan sudar.135 The testators would then sign the notes and deposit
them, along with their36wills, with whomever they would have otherwise
deposited their wills. 1

130. See COHEN, supra note 16, at 6 (noting that a considerable debt will prevent the halachic
heirs from inheriting the decendent's estate); 7 QUINT, supra note 15, at 245 n.24 (explaining that a
note of indebtedness serves as a lien on the deceased's assets).
131. COHEN, supranote 16, at 7.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 10 & n.2, 18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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C. Disadvantages
1. A Woman's Note of Indebtedness: Problem and Solution
However, the note of indebtedness method by itself does not
adequately address all potential problems and loopholes. A note of
indebtedness signed by a woman will be as effective as a note of
indebtedness signed by a man, where her husband predeceases her and
then she passes away.'3 7 But, according to Jewish law, if the wife
predeceases her husband, he would have the initial claim as sole heir of
her estate. 138 Any other mortgage or lien she had made against her
property, like a note of indebtedness, would be in a secondary position
as creditor against the estate, subordinate to her husband's primary
position. 139 Thus, if he would consider suing his late wife's non-halachic
heirs who inherited from her under her will, in a beis din, there would be
no lien against her estate in favor of the non-halachic heirs to prevent
him from doing so. 140 Thus, her note of indebtedness would be wholly

ineffective in this situation.
The solution to this problem would lie in a husband executing a
second note of indebtedness in which he would assume a debt in favor of
his and his wife's non-halachic heirs, which he would have to pay only
upon his wife's death, and conditioned on his own acceptance
of the
14
distribution plan laid out in her last will and testament. '
2. Special Rules: Problems and Solution
There are other situations in which the last will and testament,
accompanied by a note of indebtedness, would not assure compliance
with all Jewish laws of inheritance. If a husband predeceases his wife,
his estate is obligated to provide for all of her food, shelter, clothing,
living, and medical expenses or the value of her Ketubah until she
remarries.142 These payments can be significant and may exceed her
share of the estate,
in a case where a testator does not leave his entire
143
estate to his wife.

137. Id. at 6-7.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Id. at 6 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Ha'Ezer90:9).
140.

COHEN, supranote 16, at 7.

141. Id. A sample text for an additional note of indebtedness to be signed by a husband can be
found in COHEN, supra note 16, at 13-17.
142. Id. at 23 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Ha"Ezer 79:1, 93:1, 93:5, 94:1); see also supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
143. COHEN, supra note 16, at 23. It is self-evident that if the testator does indeed bequeath his
entire estate to his wife, using a will and a note of indebtedness, that even if these expenses do
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Similarly, a problem exists where a testator is survived by minor
sons and daughters. According to Jewish law, the minor daughters must
be supported from the estate with food, shelter, clothing, medical care,
and the cost of living until they reach maturity. 144 This obligation may
also exceed the daughters' share in the estate, and the daughters' share
under the testator's will would thus be inadequate under Jewish law.145
In order to resolve the aforementioned difficulties, Rabbi Feivel
Cohen recommends executing a letter, in addition to the will and note of
indebtedness. 146 In this letter, the testator would make known to the
beneficiaries of his will and to his executor, that there are situations,
such as those mentioned in the previous two paragraphs, where his will
and note of indebtedness may not ensure complete compliance with
Jewish law, and that he directs them to consult specific competent
rabbinic authorities about how to proceed in order to ensure that, if
applicable, minor daughters and his widow47 would be supported in
accordance with the mandates of Jewish law. 1
3. Secular Law Ramifications: Problems and Solutions
Marvin Shenkman and Rabbi Areye Weil suggest that there may be
tax consequences to the use of the note of indebtedness. 148 They are
concerned that the IRS may consider the value of the discharged debt in
the note of indebtedness to be "gross income." When the halachic heirs
consent to the distribution made in the last will and testament, the value
of the forgiven debt may be considered includable in gross income to the
estate. 149 They also posit that because no interest rate is defined in the
50
note of indebtedness, the IRS may impute an interest rate to the loan
and consider that amount as credited to the beneficiaries, thus resulting

exceed the value of the estate, the testator would not be faulted under Jewish law simply because his
estate was not large enough to pay all of the expenses it owed his widow.
144. Id. (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Kesubos 50b; SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Ha'Ezer

112:1). Tosafos, commenting on Kesubos 50b, further supports the proposition that minor children
are supported from the decedent's estate only until they reach the age of majority. Id.
145.

COHEN, supranote 16, at 23-24.

146. Id. at 24. For sample letters for male and female testators, see id. at 39-44.
147. Id. at24.
148. Aryeh Weil & Martin Shenkman, Wills: Halakhah and Inheritance,in BETH DIN OF
AMERICA, HALACHiC WILL MATERIALS 6 (2008), http://www.bethdin.org/docs/PDF14-

Halachic Will Materials.pdf.
149. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (as amended in 1997) ("The
discharge of indebtedness, in whole or in part, may result in the realization of income.").
150. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(b)(1) (2006) (establishing that interest may be imputed to certain
contracts that do not state an interest rate).
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in a tax liability.' 5' They also suggest that the mere creation of the note
of indebtedness in favor of
the non-halachic heir could be includable as
52
gross income for the heir.
Although an attorney must explore all angles in order to protect his
client's interests, it is this author's belief that it is highly unlikely that
any tax liability would result from the use of a note of indebtedness. The
note of indebtedness is likely not enforceable under secular law. 153 Thus,
it will not be considered an "indebtedness" subject to discharge for the
income tax purposes because the Internal Revenue Code defines the term
"indebtedness" as a debt "(A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or (B)
subject to which the taxpayer holds property.'

4

A note of indebtedness

fails to meet either of these statutory definitions of an indebtedness
because (A) the taxpayer (here, the halachic heir) is not liable to pay
back the debt in a secular court because the promise to pay lacks
consideration;155 and (B) the taxpayer would not receive any property or
services with proportional value to the amount of the "debt" being
discharged.
A note that is executed for the benefit of one's spouse or children
without receipt of specific goods, services, or promises in return is thus
given without consideration and would thus be unenforceable in secular
courts. 156

Although it is true that the New York Court of Appeals did hold
one hundred years ago that a contract is enforceable as to a third party,
for which the only consideration is a husband's general obligation to
support his wife, 5 7 modem courts applying tax law have not taken the
view of the Court of Appeals as it applies to the status of discharges of
indebtedness as part of gross income. The Sixth Circuit held that where a
taxpayer's creditor discharged a debt that she had taken on for her
husband's benefit, without consideration, by executing a note of
indebtedness to her husband's creditor, the discharge of the debt was not

151. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(a) (as amended in 1966) ("As a general rule, interest received by
or credited to the taxpayer constitutes gross income and is fully taxable. Interest income includes
interest on ...a promissory note[and] ... interest on legacies.").

152. Weil & Shenkman, supra note 148, at 6.
153. See Bradford v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 935, 938 (6th Cir. 1956) (holding that where a spouse
executed a note of indebtedness for no consideration, cancellation of that debt is not includable in
gross income).
154. I.R.C. § 108(d)(1) (2006).
155. See Bradford,233 F.2d at 938.
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he formation of a
contract requires ... a consideration.").
157. Buchanan v. Tilden, 52 N.E. 724, 726 (N.Y. 1899).
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includable in gross income.158 Similarly, if a testator executes a note of
indebtedness for the benefit of his wife or daughter without
consideration, the debt would not be considered subject to collection in
secular courts, indicating that the note of indebtedness that this Note
addresses would not meet the 159
first prong of the Internal Revenue Code's
definition of an indebtedness.
This author would also like to suggest that the note of indebtedness
would never be considered indebtedness for the purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code because it never attains the status of a debt to the testator
or to his estate. The Third Circuit stated that "[a] debt.. .for federal tax
purposes [is] an 'unconditional and legally enforceable obligation for the
payment of money."" 160 Here, because the testator's whole obligation to
the non-halachic heirs is conditioned on the halachic heirs challenging
the testator's will, the debt is not unconditional, as required under the
Internal Revenue Code. It is also not legally enforceable as noted
above. 61 Thus, no "unconditional and legally enforceable obligation" to
the non-halachicheirs exists in the note of indebtedness prior to any will
challenge by the halachic heirs. And if they do challenge the will in a
beis din, the note will immediately become payable and will thus not be
discharged. Therefore, no situation exists wherein a subsequently
discharged note of indebtedness would ever constitute a clear
"unconditional and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of
money."
Weil and Shenkman themselves acknowledge that it is unlikely that
any tax liability would arise from the discharge of the note of
indebtedness that would take place when the halachic heirs accede to the
terms of the testator's will, but they nevertheless suggest that one take
steps to ensure that the note of indebtedness is drafted in such a way as
to minimize the likelihood that the IRS would consider its discharge to
be income to the estate of the testator.162 They suggest using Hebrew
terminology in the note of indebtedness to differentiate it from other
163
documents which would normally be enforceable in secular courts.
They also suggest not delivering the note of indebtedness to the nonhalachic heirs, for whose benefit the note is executed.' 64 By doing so,
158.
159.
160.
Comm'r,
161.
162.
163.
164.

Bradford, 233 F.2d at938.
See§ 108(d)(1).
Comm'r v. McKay Prods. Corp., 178 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1949) (quoting Autenreith v.
115 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1940)).
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
Weil & Shenkman, supranote 148, at 6.
Id.
Id.
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they posit that the note would be less enforceable under secular law
because of the absence of the 65
delivery requirement, which is required for
valid gifts under secular law.'
V. THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW
A. The Problem
One may wonder why, even if the aforementioned methods of
"circumventing" Jewish inheritance law are valid, they do not violate the
spirit of the law. The sages in the Talmud state that although one may
find a way of validly and effectively disinheriting his halachic heirs, one
should not be party to the disinheritance of a halachic heir.' 66 The
Talmud further states that if one disinherits halachic heirs, "the spirit of
the sages are not pleased with him.' 67 This view is also codified in the
Code of Jewish Law. 68 How then do those authorities who advocate any
of these methods of "avoiding" the Jewish inheritance law requirements
address the contention that they are violating the "spirit of the law," if
not the letter?
B. Solutions
There are four major reasons why, given the circumstances within
which modem testators conduct their estate planning, the
aforementioned methods of estate planning do not violate the "spirit of
the law." Where, as this Note suggests, a testator bequeaths equal shares
of his estate to his daughters and sons, many Jewish law authorities
maintain that this practice does not constitute a violation of the "spirit of
the law," because, first, rabbinic authorities want to encourage people to
leave their daughters equal shares of their estates to serve the public
169
policy of facilitating the marriageability of the testator's daughters.
Second, distributing one's estate equally does not violate the spirit of
Jewish inheritance law because many authorities maintain that as long as
one's sons receive at least some portion of the estate, one has not
violated the spirit of the law. 170 Third, equal distribution of an estate
165. See supranote 105 and accompanying text.
166. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Basra 133b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD Kesubos 53a.
167. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Basra 133b.

168. SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 282:1.
169. COHEN, supra note 16, at 27. By increasing independent wealth among women, the rabbis
hope to increase their marriage prospects.
170. Id.at 31-32.
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furthers the public policy of promoting harmony and preventing
acrimony in the family.171 And fourth, bequeathing one's entire estate to
his sons, to the exclusion of his wife and daughters, will likely motivate
them to litigate the matter172in the secular court system, which is
prohibited under Jewish law.
Devising equal share to daughters serves the function of improving
their marriage prospects.' 73 According to the authorities who offer this
reason to explain why efforts to circumvent the standard Jewish law of
inheritance maintain that facilitating marriage by increasing the financial
resources of women overrides the general disapproval of disinheriting
sons from their normal status as sole halachic heirs. 174 Even if a
testator's daughters are already married, the general policy of increasing
daughters' marriage prospects would still be served by ensuring that they
receive equal shares in the testator's estate. The general expectancy by
the testator's daughter's potential grooms that she would be left an equal
share of her father's estate increases her chances of finding a mate. Thus,
the father's subsequent decision to ensure that his daughter receives an
equal share of his estate retroactively increased his daughter's marriage
prospects. 175
Furthermore, many Jewish law authorities hold that one only
violates the sages' expressions of disapproval for disinheriting halachic
heirs where they are completely excluded from the estate. 176 The
methods this Note discussed, which are designed to ensure that a male
testator's daughters receive an equal share of his estate, address ways of
achieving parity between sons' and daughters' inheritance rights. They
do not advocate completely disinheriting sons. Therefore, these
authorities would hold that the aforementioned methods do not violate
"the spirit of the law."
Many modem authorities in Jewish law also state that the public
policy of avoiding the acrimony and bitterness that would result when
some children receive an inheritance, while others do not, supersedes the
policy against partially disinheriting halachic heirs. 177 Thus, in order to
171. JACHTER, supra note 8, at 295.
172. Mordechai Willig, Inheritance Without a Fight. Writing a Will in Modern Times,
TORAHWEB (2007), http://www.torahweb.org/torah/special/2007/rwilwill.html.
173. COHEN, supranote 16, at 27.
174. Id.
175. Id.at31.
176. Id. at 31-32 (citing a number of halachic responsa who maintain that only total
disinheritance of one's Jewish law heirs invites the disapproval of the sages).
177. JACHTER, supra note 8, at 295-96. One may argue that this factor is not unique to modem
times. If acrimony and discord would be the result of an unequal distribution of the estate, it would
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avoid the family strife that is likely to result from an unequal distribution
of shares of an estate between a testator's children, a testator will not
violate the "spirit of the law" of inheritance
by granting equal shares of
17 8
his estate to both sons and daughters.
Rabbi Mordechai Willig, dean and rosh kollel at the Rabbi Isaac
Elchanan Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University, 79 points out that
if a testator decides to follow the strict letter of the law and exclude his
wife and daughters from his estate, he is effectively encouraging them to
violate Jewish law in two ways. First, he is encouraging them to
transgress the prohibition against litigating in secular courts to increase
their share of his estate. 180 Second, if they are successful and the court
deviates from the terms of the testator's will, he is also causing his nonhalachic
heirs to violate the prohibition of theft from his halachic
8
heirs.' '
As applied to Fred and Judith's situation, we see that if Fred
decides to leave his entire estate to his son David, and nothing to Judith
or Esther, he runs into many problems. Esther's financial means would
be lessened, thus decreasing her marriage prospects. He would create
acrimony and bitterness in that his widow, Judith, would resent him for
not fully supporting her after his death, and Esther and David's
relationship is likely to be permanently damaged, if not destroyed, by
their unequal treatment. Furthermore, Judith or Esther may attempt to
challenge Fred's distribution under the will, thus transgressing the
prohibition against litigating in secular courts, and if either of them were
successful, they would be guilty of theft for taking away part of David's
share under the will without his consent.
Thus, most Jewish law authorities maintain that a testator should
use some method to ensure that his wife receives a full share of his
estate, and that if both husband and wife pass away, that all of their
children receive equal shares of the estate. One should use one of the
methods explained in this Note to effectuate this distribution in
be no less so in the past than it is today. However, women's liberation and the advent of feminism in
relatively modem times have changed the family dynamic even in observant Jewish circles.
Differences in the treatment of sons versus daughters, that may not have raised an eyebrow even
200 years ago, would now be viewed as highly offensive and unfair. Sylvia Barack Fishman, The
Impact of Feminism on American Jewish Life, in 89 AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK 3, 44 (1989),
available at http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC DATA/Files/1989_3_SpecialArticles.pdf.
178. COHEN, supranote 16, at 29.
179. Bella and Harry Wexner Kollel Elyon and Semikha Honors Program is Established at

RIETS: Rabbi Mordechai Willig is Rosh Kollel, CHAVRUSA, Oct. 1998, at 3, 7, http://www.yu.edu/
cms/uploadedFiles/ChagHaSemikha/VOL%20XXX 1%20NO2%200CT%201198.pdf.
180. Willig, supranote 172 (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Choshen Mishpat 26:1).
181. Id.
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accordance with Jewish law because such a plan is preferable not only as
a matter of public policy and family harmony, but also because it is the
preferred method in most situations according to Jewish law.
VI. CONCLUSION

The note of indebtedness method, in conjunction with a typical last
will and testament is likely to be the most practical approach to eliminate
any conflict between secular and Jewish inheritance law for the majority
of observant Jewish individuals. As this Note has demonstrated, this
method would alleviate the conflict between observant Jews' estate
planning goals according to most authorities on Jewish law. And since
its enforceability in secular courts is irrelevant,' 8 2 its effectiveness under
secular law poses no difficulty.
Relatively high net-worth clients may prefer to use methods other
than the note of indebtedness to address the conflict between Jewish and
secular inheritance law. They may use various other methods of estate
planning that are often used to minimize tax liability or to avoid the
costs associated with probating one's estate. 8 3 Such individuals may
give the maximum nontaxable gift to each of their grandchildren directly
or to a trust established for each grandchild's benefit every year.
Alternatively, they may set up trusts for themselves or their spouses in
order to avoid probate costs and ensure that their assets are used in
accordance with their wishes after they pass away. Estate plans such as
these would place those assets outside the scope of one's "probate
estate" which would have reverted to his halachic heirs at death, thus
solving the Jewish/secular inheritance law problem. However, this
author believes that it would still be advisable for such individuals to
execute a last will and testament and a note of indebtedness to remove
the conflict between secular and Jewish inheritance law as to the small
amount of property that he may own at death which he failed to give or
transfer out of his "probate estate."
Although it is not appropriate for every circumstance, it is this
author's opinion that for the majority of individuals, the method with the
widest rabbinic acceptance, the most practical, and lowest maintenance
method of halachic estate planning would be the execution of a typical

182. See supranotes 122-24 and accompanying text.
183. See generally, David Joulfaian & Kathleen McGarry, Estate and Gift Tax Incentives and
Inter Vivos Giving, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 429 (2004), availableat http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax%5Cntjrec.nsf/
EE5B02DOE7DB37D285256EB3005EA36E/$FILE/Article%2004-McGarry.pdf
(examining the
role of estate and gift taxes on inter vivos gifts).
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last will and testament by both a husband and wife, according to their
wishes, and executing notes of indebtedness along with the letters
recommended by Rabbi Feivel Cohen.1 84 It should also be noted that
some clients may follow rabbinic authorities that differ with the
approach laid out in this Note. If an attorney is consulted by a client
whose rabbi does not recommend the note of indebtedness method, this
author would encourage him to communicate with that client's rabbinic
authority in order to discover which estate planning methods are
acceptable to that client.
However, even those clients who dispose of the majority of their
assets by inter vivos gift or through trusts should probably execute a note
of indebtedness in order to create the incentive for the halachic heirs not
to challenge the distribution of those items that fall outside of the trust
corpus in a beis din.
Benjamin C. Wolf*

184. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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